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been adopted by three states, 2 5 provides one solution to the problem. 2r
It enables a police officer to stop any person whom he has reasonable
grounds to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime and demand of him his name, address, what he is doing,
and where he is going. If the person does not satisfactorily explain
his actions, the officer can detain him for further investigation. The
detention is not an arrest and no record of it is made by the police.
The maximum detention period is two hours and the person must be
released or arrested and charged with a crime at the end of the detention period. The constitutionality of the Uniform Arrest Act has
been upheld by the highest courts of two states. 27 It presents a
straightforward attack on the law enforcement problem, and does
not subject a person to being arrested and possibly convicted for
violating an excessively broad and vague vagrancy-type statute or
ordinance.
R. M. ROBINSON

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY FOR
INTENTIONAL TORTS AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965)
Fisherv. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965)
In City of Miami v. Simpson, plaintiff sued the city of Miami
claiming compensatory and punitive damages for an .alleged intentional assault by city police officers. The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a summary judgment that had been entered in the
city's favor. 2 On appeal the Florida Supreme Court HELD, Florida
municipalities are liable for intentional torts committed by municipal
employees within the scope of their employment. Justice Caldwell
dissenting.3
25. DaL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, §1902 (1953); N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
RI. GEN. LAws ANN. §12-7-1 (1956).

§594:2

(1955);

26. See Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons,59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950).
27. Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961); Kavanagh v. Stenhouse,
174 A.2d 560 (R.I.), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 (1961).
1. 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965).
2. Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
3. City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965) (Caldwell, J., dissenting).
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In Fisher v. City of Miami,4 a companion case on similar facts,
plaintiff appealed from a Third District Court of Appeal decision
holding that punitive damages could not be recovered from a municipality for intentional torts.5 The Florida Supreme Court HELD,
absent a legislative pronouncement to the contrary, municipalities
are not liable for punitive damages when sued for an intentional tort
committed by an employee in the scope of his duties.
In these two decisions the Florida Supreme Court clarified its
opinion in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,6 an opinion that had
given rise to divergent views in the district courts of appeal.7 In
Hargrove the court permitted a wrongful death action against the
municipality of Cocoa Beach when plaintiff's husband, a prisoner in
the city jail, died from smoke suffocation as a consequence of alleged
negligence of city employees. The Hargrove decision eliminated the
elusive distinctions between proprietary and governmental functions
and applied the doctrine of respondeatsuperior in resolving problems
of municipal tort liability. The Hargrove court seemed unconcerned
whether the torts were intentional or unintentional, stating that it
would be a fundamental injustice to hold a municipality liable for
a police officer's negligent driving8 but immune if the officer gets out
of his automobile and wrongfully assaults a citizen. 9 But the court
also used other language indicating that the decision was limited to
negligent torts. 10 As a result, confusion arose in the district courts
of appeal as to whether municipalities should be held liable for intentional as well as negligent torts.
Although no district court since Hargrove has clearly based its
decision denying liability in a tort action on the ground that the tort
was an intentional one, implications to that effect can be found in
Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach" (first district) and Gordon
v. City of Belle Glade 2 (second district). Thus when the majority

4. 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965).
5. Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So. 2d 57 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
6. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). For further background material see Price &
Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 330
(1953) and Note, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 90 (1963).
7. Compare Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1959), with City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So. 2d 23 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1960), and Gordon v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So. 2d 449 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
8. City of Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So. 2d 825 (1946).
9. City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
10. "[W]hen an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused
by the negligence of a municipal employee.
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
11. 113 So. 2d 431 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
12. 132 So. 2d 449 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
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of the Third District Court of Appeal held in Simpson 13 that intentional torts were included in the Hargrove doctrine, it was probable
that the decision would be deemed in conflict with the other district
courts.
Beside the intentional-unintentional confusion, the district courts
have had to grapple with exceptions to municipal liability delineated
by the Florida Supreme Court in Hargrove and other cases. These
exceptions to municipal liability were for legislative, quasi-legislative
and judicial, quasi-judicial acts committed by municipal employees.
The court's example of legislative, quasi-legislative immunity was
Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach'4 in which an attempt was made to
hold the city liable for damages resulting from the enforcement of an
unconstitutional ordinance. Akin v. City of Miami" was used as an
example of judicial, quasi-judicial immunity; in Akin a landowner
attempted to recover damages from the city of Miami for refusal
to grant a building permit. These exceptions seem designed to protect
the municipality and its employees in the reasonable exercise of discretionary powers. Since Hargrove the district courts have found
new examples of judicial and legislative functions. The First District
Court in Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach' deemed an alleged
malicious arrest to be a quasi-judicial corporate function of a municipal employee and hence an exception to Hargrove. The Third
District Court in Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village" deemed
alleged negligence by a fire department in failing to extinguish a
fire to be an exercise by municipal officials of legislative or quasilegislative powers. Although certiorari was denied, Steinhardt is at
most a tenuous example of legislative functions.
To complicate further the interpretation of Hargrove, the Second
District Court of Appeal in Gordon v. City of Belle Glade's decided
that the Hargrove court, although it had approved the dissents in
City of Miami v. Bethel 9 and Williams v. City of Green Cove
Springs,2O had not specifically overruled those cases. Bethel involved
the "working over" by Miami policemen of a person suspected of
playing dice and Williams involved a wrongful death action against
the city of Green Cove Springs for failing to remove plaintiff's decedent from a burning jail. Both cases were dismissed, because of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
2d 737
18.
19.
20.

Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1963).
132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938).
65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953).
113 So. 2d 431 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
132 So. 2d 764 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 141 So.
(Fla. 1962).
132 So. 2d 449 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
65 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
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municipal immunity, with dissents calling for a reexamination of
Florida's municipal tort law. Although reaching its decision on
another point, the district court in Gordon, a case on virtually the
same facts as Bethel, failed to recognize that the supreme court intended to adopt the dissenter's reasoning. Thus the district courts
were confused as to the supreme court's intent in Hargrove, a confusion that was beginning to produce conflicting decisions.
The supreme court in Simpson emphasizes that Hargrove was constructed on the foundation of respondeat superior stating that there
is no reason to restrict the respondeat superior concept to negligent
torts. Approving once again the dissent in City of Miami v. Bethel,21
where the dissenters would have held the city liable for an intentional
tort, the court states that Simpson is not an extension of the Hargrove
doctrine but is simply a "logical judicial antiphon to the concept
there announced." 22 The court says that the city is liable only when
the act is done by the servant within the real or apparent scope of
the master's business and that this is a question for determination by
a jury. Thus the rules in determining tort liability applicable to
private corporations would also be applicable to municipal corporations.
In Fisher, plaintiff relied on Hargrove and dicta in the 1940 case
of City of Miami v. McCorkle23 which implied that a municipality
might be liable for punitive damages. The court further clarifies
Hargrove by stating that in McCorkle only the individual's right to
compensation for a wrong done was approved, not the right to punitive damages. Citing other jurisdictions and basic policy reasons, the
court refuses to permit punitive damages against a municipality. The
basic concept behind this decision is that punishment and deterrence
are the primary reasons for punitive damages, and to grant these
would be to penalize the taxpayers who not only had no part in the
commission of the tort, but who are expected to benefit from the
public example that the punishment makes of the wrongdoer. Also,
Florida has a rule that permits evidence of the wealth of a tortfeasor
as a measure of the amount of punitive damages that should be
awarded - the theory being the wealthier the wrongdoer, the greater
the award. Because of its taxing power a municipality has unlimited
wealth, which would not afford a proper guide in determining the
amount of the punitive award. On the other hand, if evidence of the
city's wealth is prohibited, there would be no guide for the jury in
determining what would punish the municipality. Municipal employees could be held liable for punitive damages in their individual
21. 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
22. City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435, 437 (Fla. 1965).
23. 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (1940).
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